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Our economists have considerable experience in completing pre-merger risk assessments, initial filings in Phase I of the EC Merger Regulation, and its national equivalents, and in Phase II investigations.

These range from data collection and analysis, to economic analysis of market definition, market power (dominance or the newer tests of ‘substantial impediment of competition’ and ‘substantially lessening competition’), competitive and empirical analysis relevant to these issues, and in assessing proposed and alternative remedies.

CASE economists have appeared before the European Commission as well as national competition authorities in the UK, the Netherlands, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Portugal, Australia; and other administrative bodies and courts.

Our economists have been involved in some of the largest global and European mergers including Proctor & Gamble/ GilletteSonae/ Portugal TelecomT-Mobile/ Tele.ringE.ON/ MOLDong/ Elsam/E2Carnival/ P&O Princess CruisesTelia/ SoneraMCI/ WorldComHP/ CompaqSeagrams/ PolygramTelia/ TelenorVodafone/ Mannesmann and AOL/ Time Warner.

Recent assignments:

  • pre-merger antitrust risk assessments of proposed mergers in the shipping, personal care, industrial chemicals and communications industries
  • product and geographic market definition in European energy markets
  • chain of substitution in tour holiday markets
  • product and geographic market definition in fixed, cable and mobile communication services markets
  • definition of relevant radio and advertising markets
  • market definition and competitive impact of airline alliances
  • vertical effects of communications mergers
  • network effects in pay TV mergers
  • foreclosure due to price internalisation and first mover advantages
  • competitive effects of switching capacity across geographical markets
  • competitive effects and links between competitors in separate regions
  • entry analysis in consumer product markets
  • “mutual moderation” between telecoms operators in separate markets
  • comparative competition in water utility mergers
  • vertical and horizontal separation remedies in a telecoms merger
  • behavioural remedies to deal with foreclosure and price squeezes
  • a joint venture in the nuclear energy industry
  • regulatory remedies including unbundling and wholesale capacity auctions
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