Antitrust

Economics plays a prominent role in competition law. The definition of the relevant market and the determination of the effects of alleged antitrust infringements increasingly require rigorous economic and quantitative analysis.

Experience has shown that even apparently straightforward competition problems require the considerations of conflicting theories and justifications, and complex factual circumstances which require systematic and rigorous analysis.

We use economic and empirical techniques to address critical issues and marshall evidence to define relevant markets, analyse allegations of abuse of dominance and anti-competitive practices, and to provide evidence of the likely effects of any alleged anti-competitive conduct. 

Our economists have undertaken work in all the major areas of European antitrust – abuse of dominance, anti-competitive practices and agreements, State Aid as well as market investigations.  They have considerable experience of national competition laws within Europe and the AsiaPacific region.

CASE economists have prepared expert reports and appeared before the European Commission; and competition agencies and courts in the UK, Italy, Germany, Netherlands, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Sweden, Finland, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Hong Kong and Indonesia.

Recent assignments:

  • definition of relevant product and geographical markets
  • market power and concentration analyses
  • indirect constraints and ‘leveraged’ dominance
  • joint/collective dominance
  • abuse of dominance
  • refusal to supply and essential facilities
  • access to essential facilities
  • excessive pricing
  • price discrimination and discounts
  • margin squeeze
  • FRAND prices and royalties
  • joint cost allocation and predatory pricing
  • bundling
  • after-markets
  • two-sided markets
  • contract pricing and restrictive agreements
  • distribution agreements
  • evaluation of administered contracts
  • network membership rules
  • network access arrangements and pricing
  • Article 101(3) efficiency assessments
  • unbundling and retail competition
  • network sharing proposals
  • State aid
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